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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRADLEY SPOTTS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 920202 CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) of the Utah Code confers upon the Utah 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction in this matter. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion in 
light of his or her experience to stop the driver of a vehicle 
where the driver, in a deserted parking lot, smokes a one-and-a-
half inch long, rolled cigarette that burns rapidly? 
2. Whether the corpus delicti for possession of a 
controlled substance can be established without producing an 
identifiable amount of the substance in question? 
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3. Whether the City proffered sufficient direct or 
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the substance possessed by the Defendant was marijuana? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
1. United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), adopted by 
Provo City Ordinances § 9.40.040. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while 
acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this 
subsection; 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (N) (Supp. 1992). 
[Marijuana is a controlled substance]. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(27) (1990). 
"Possession11 or "use" means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, 
belonging, maintaining, obtaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as 
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances, 
and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use 
of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or 
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he 
be shown to have individually possessed, used or controlled 
the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he 
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, 
possession, or control of any substance with knowledge that 
the activity was occurring, [Emphasis added]. 
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5. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Provo City agrees with the Appellant's statement of the 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on the 28th of September 1991, 
Defendant, Bradley Spotts, drove his pick-up truck into the Eagle 
Systems parking lot at 5600 North University Avenue where he 
stopped to drop off a passenger. (Trial Transcript 4-5). The 
business was closed and the parking lot was deserted except for 
one other vehicle which belonged to Officer Ingrid Weinmuller, of 
the Provo City Police Department. (T.T. 18). The Defendant 
stopped his truck ten feet in front of Weinmuller' s car. (T.T. 
5). 
Weinmuller was in uniform and had been assigned to direct 
traffic after a BYU football game. Because the game was not 
over, she was sitting in her car waiting for traffic to increase 
when Defendant Spotts parked directly in front of her. (T.T. 4-
5). It was daylight and Weinmuller had an unobstructed view of 
the Defendant and his passenger. (T.T. 5, 7). 
After the Defendant's passenger left, Weinmuller observed 
that the Defendant "took some hits11 off a half inch long, rolled 
cigarette. (T.T. 6). She noted that as the Defendant inhaled, 
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the orange tip of the cigarette quickly disintegrated. (T.T. 6). 
Based on her POST academy training and her experience with former 
friends who used marijuana, Officer Weinmuller concluded that the 
cigarette smoked by the Defendant was a marijuana joint. (T.T. 
6). During cross-examination, however, Weinmuller stated that 
she did not know whether a rolled tobacco cigarette would burn 
differently than a rolled marijuana cigarette. (T.T. 14-15). 
As Weinmuller got out of her vehicle, the Defendant began to 
drive away. (T.T. 7). He had proceeded about ten feet when he 
heard Weinmuller verbalize something and saw her motion for him 
to stop. (T.T. 7, 14, 33-34). The Defendant stopped and got out 
of his truck. He was approximately three feet from Weinmuller. 
(T.T. 8). Weinmuller testified that the Defendant was exhaling 
smoke from his mouth as he opened the truck door and that she 
immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana on his breath and 
about his person. (T.T. 8-9). In her experience, Officer 
Weinmuller has never mistaken the smell of tobacco for the smell 
of marijuana. (T.T. 15). 
Weinmuller observed that the Defendant was relaxed and spoke 
very slowly. (T.T. 8-9). A Nystagmus test revealed that the 
Defendant's eyes were very bloodshot and were jerking rapidly at 
maximum deviation and at 45 degrees. (T.T. 9). Weinmuller 
testified that these characteristics indicate that a person may 
be impaired by drugs or alcohol. (T.T. 13). Officer Weinmuller 
received consent to search the truck, however, she did not 
discover any controlled substances. (T.T. 9). 
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After he was stopped, the Defendant made several inculpatory 
statements. When Officer Weinmuller asked him what he had done 
with the marijuana cigarette, the Defendant replied that he had 
given it to his friend. (T.T. 10). He also admitted to taking a 
few "hits11 off the cigarette. (T.T. 11). Finally, when Officer 
Weinmuller told the Defendant that it was illegal to possess 
marijuana and to drive while impaired by marijuana, he replied, 
"Do you think I would be driving if it was going to affect my 
driving?" (T.T. 11). 
The trial court found the Defendant guilty of possession of 
a controlled substance in violation of section 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) 
of the Utah Code. (T.T. 44). The court denied the Defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence acquired and statements made after 
his seizure. It also denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
for insufficient evidence. (T.T. 22, 38). Defendant appealed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment rights of the Defendant were not 
violated. Officer Weinmuller articulated specific facts, in 
light of her experience, that led her to conclude that the 
Defendant was engaged in criminal conduct. Because the seizure 
of the Defendant was based on this reasonable suspicion, the 
trial court did not err in denying the Defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, this 
court must assess the totality of the circumstances and assess 
the degree of suspicion that attaches to both innocent and guitly 
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conduct. While no single act of the Defendant was proof of 
illegal conduct, the circumstances taken together amounted to 
reasonable suspicion. 
The City established the corpus delicti of the crime of 
posession of a controlled substance by showing clearly and 
convincingly that the Defendant knowingly inhaled marijuana. 
Real evidence is not required to meet this burden. The City 
established the corpus delicti by evidence independent of the 
Defendant's inculpatory statements; therefore, even if the 
statements were wrongly admitted, their admission was harmless 
error. 
Because the City proved by direct evidence that the 
Defendant possessed marijuana, the Dolan factors for proof by 
circumstantial evidence do not apply. In the alternative, the 
City marshalled sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that 
the substance possessed by the Defendant was marijuana. While 
the Dolan factors are relevant to this inquiry, they are not an 
exhaustive list. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER WEINMULLER'S SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
What the Fourth Amendment "forbids is not all . . . 
seizures, but unreasonable . . . seizures." Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680 (1960). A 
seizure is reasonable if it is 1) justified at its inception; and 
2) reasonable in scope. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 
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2d 889, 905 (1968). The Defendant contends that the seizure of 
his person was unconstitutional because it was not justified at 
its inception; and therefore, that all evidence and statements 
obtained as a result of this unconstitutional stop should have 
been suppressed. 
A. Standard of Review 
This court should review the trial court's factual findings 
regarding the Defendant's motion to suppress under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard. State v. Lopez, 186 U.A.R. 17, 18 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). The trial court's 
"ultimate conclusions" drawn from those facts with respect to the 
admission or exclusion of evidence should be reviewed under a 
"correction of error standard." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 
565 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. The City Concedes That The Defendant Was Seized. 
It is now beyond question that the "stopping of an 
automobile and detaining its occupants" constitutes a seizure 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
This remains true even where the "purpose of the stop is limited 
and the resulting detention quite brief." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has consistently held that a 
Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when 1) an officer by show of 
authority restricts the liberty of a person; and 2) a "reasonable 
person based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not 
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in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation 
but, rather, because he believes he is not free to leave." State 
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987), quoting. United 
States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980); State v. Menke, 
787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah App. 1990). 
The record indicates that the Defendant had proceeded about 
ten feet when Officer Weinmuller, who was in uniform, verbalized 
something and motioned for him to stop his vehicle. (T.T. 7, 14, 
33-34) . Because, under these circumstances, the Defendant was 
reasonable in his belief that he was not free to leave, the City 
concedes that the Defendant was seized. (T.T. 34). 
C. Officer Weinmuller Had Reasonable Suspicion That The 
Defendant Was Engaged In Criminal Activity And 
Therefore, Her Seizure Of The Defendant Was Justified 
At Its Inception. 
Because the City concedes that the Defendant was seized, the 
issue before the court is whether that seizure was 
constitutionally reasonable. A seizure is reasonable if it is 1) 
justified at its inception; and 2) reasonable in scope. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). As noted above, Defendant 
challenges the first of these two criteria. 
1. In Developing Reasonable Suspicion, Police 
Officers Must Identify Specific, Articulable Facts 
Which, In Light Of Their Experience, Lead To An 
Inference Of Criminal Activity. 
An investigatory seizure is justified at its inception so 
long as the seizing officer can point to "specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. 
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Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-
18 (Utah 1987). As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
officer "must be able to articulate what it is about those facts 
which leads to an inference of criminal activity.11 State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990). 
In section 77-7-15 of the Utah Code, the Utah Legislature 
codified the rule set forth in Terry v. Ohio. That section 
provides that a "peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). 
In assessing conduct, the "trained law enforcement officer 
is in a different position than the average citizen." State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1990). The trained officer is 
"able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer." State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88-89 (Utah App. 1987). For this reason, 
in developing reasonable suspicion, police officers are permitted 
to assess the available facts in light of their experience. Id. 
Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); United States v. 
Bricroni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); State v. Baumqaertel, 
762 P.2d 2, 4 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the case at hand, Officer Weinmuller identified specific, 
articulable facts, which in light of her experience, led to a 
reasonable inference of criminal activity. When asked what led 
her to the conclusion that the Defendant was smoking a marijuana 
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joint as opposed to something else, Officer Weinmuller explained 
that the Defendant's joint was "rolled11 and was "smaller than a 
cigarette and it was probably a half an inch long." (T.T. 6). 
She further explained that as the Defendant inhaled on the joint, 
she could "see the orange . . . rapidly disintegrate, not as a 
cigarette would." (T.T. 6). 
While this conduct may not have been suspicious to the 
untrained observer, Officer Weinmuller is in a "different 
position than the average citizen." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 541 (Utah 1990). In her POST academy experience, she was 
trained to recognize the physical characteristics of marijuana 
joints. She had also become familiar with their appearance from 
her experience in high school where certain of her acquaintances 
smoked marijuana. From this experience, Officer Weinmuller 
learned that marijuana joints as a general rule are rolled in 
paper, are shorter, and burn more rapidly than commercial tobacco 
cigarettes. (T.T. 6, 14). 
Thus, when Officer Weinmuller observed that the Defendant's 
cigarette exhibited these characteristics, she had reasonable 
suspicion that the Defendant was "in the act of committing . . . 
a public offence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). This 
reasonable suspicion justified the seizure of the Defendant at 
its inception. Because the seizure was justified at its 
inception, and therefore, "reasonable" under the Fourth 
Amendment, the trial court correctly admitted the evidence 
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derived from the seizure, including the Defendant's inculpatory 
pre-arrest statements. 
2. The Reasonable Suspicion Inquiry Does Not Require 
This Court To Determine Whether the Defendant's 
Conduct Was Innocent Or Guilty; Rather, The Court 
Must Assess The Degree Of Suspicion That Attaches 
To The Totality Of The Circumstances. 
Defendant contends that reasonable suspicion cannot arise 
out of facts and conduct that are consistent with innocent 
behavior. This contention does not accurately describe relevant 
United States Supreme Court holdings or Utah case law. 
In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), the U.S. 
Supreme Court was faced with a question similar to the one at 
issue. In that case, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") 
agents stopped the defendant, Andrew Sokolow, at the Honolulu 
International Airport because Sokolow met all the elements of the 
DEA drug courier profile. Before stopping Sokolow, the DEA 
agents knew the following facts: 1) Sokolow had "paid $2,100.00 
for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20.00 bills11 containing 
nearly twice that amount; 2) he traveled under an alias; 3) his 
"original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit 
drugs11; 4) even though the round-trip flight from Honolulu to 
Miami takes 20 hours, Sokolow stayed in Miami for only 48 hours; 
5) he "appeared nervous" while on his trip; and 6) he did not 
check any of his luggage. Id., 490 U.S. at 3. 
At trial, Sokolow moved to suppress the cocaine and other 
evidence on the ground that he had been unlawfully seized. The 
District Court for Hawaii denied the motion, but the Ninth 
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Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. In denying the Federal 
Government's petition for rehearing, the Circuit Court explained 
that in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion, courts 
must not consider "probabilistic evidence" of criminal behavior 
unless at least one fact showing "on-going criminal activity" 
exists. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that 
"the concept of reasonable suspicion . . . is not readily, or 
even usefully reduced to a neat set of legal rules" and that the 
Circuit Court's decision created "unnecessary difficulty in 
dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment." Id., 490 U.S. at 7, quoting, Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1989). 
The simple concept referred to by the Court is that in 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts must 
examine the "totality of the circumstances—the whole picture." 
Id., 490 U.S. at 7-8, quoting, United States v. Cortez, 44 9 U.S. 
411, 417 (1981). See, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. , 110 L. Ed. 
2d 301, 309 (1990); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988); State 
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Supreme Court explained that the Ninth Circuit ruling 
drew a "sharp line between types of evidence, the probative value 
of which varies only in degree." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8. Of the 
factors known to the DEA agents, not one, standing alone was 
proof of illegal conduct and all the factors were "quite 
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consistent with innocent travel"; however, the Court held that in 
making the determination of reasonable suspicion, "the relevant 
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 
'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular 
non-criminal acts."1 Id. , 490 U.S. at 10. 
In the case at bar, the Defendant claims that because his 
behavior was "consistent with innocent conduct," it cannot give 
rise to reasonable suspicion. As explained, this argument 
distorts the reasonable suspicion inquiry, shifting the courts' 
focus from the "totality of the circumstances" standard under 
which facts differ only in degree of probative value, to a "guilt 
or innocence" standard, under which facts differ in kind. 
1
 Defendant cites State v. Chambers, 687 P.2d 805 (Or. App. 
1984) as authority. This decision, however, suffers from the same 
flaws as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sokolow. 
In Chambers, a police officer observed the defendant repeatedly 
bringing a match up to his mouth. The officer knew that when using 
a pipe, it is difficult to keep marijuana lit. Based on this 
knowledge, the officer concluded that the defendant was smoking 
marijuana. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that these facts did 
not constitute reasonable suspicion because "trouble lighting a 
pipe (or keeping it lit) appears to be the lot of all those who 
essay to smoke those devices." Id., 687 P.2d at 808. 
Like the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court in Chambers 
appears to have based its decision on the premise that conduct 
consistent with innocent behavior cannot give rise to reasonable 
suspicion, rather than the degree of suspicion that attached to the 
non-criminal act of repeatedly lighting matches and bringing them 
near to the mouth. 
In addition, Chambers can be distinguished on its facts. In 
Chambers, the police officer "could not even see the pipe, much 
less what was in it." Id. All the officer saw was that the 
defendant was repeatedly lighting matches. In the case at bar, 
Officer Weinmuller testified that she plainly saw the cigarette 
being smoked and that it had the physical characteristics of a 
marijuana joint. 
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Utah case law is also instructive on this point. One month 
after Sokolow was decided, the Utah Court of Appeals reached a 
similar conclusion in State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 
1989) . In that case, two police officers stopped a pickup truck 
after the driver appeared to have made a prostitution deal with 
the defendant, Charlene Ann Holmes. Holmes had been "strolling11 
down State Street, "turning occasionally to look back at 
traffic." Id., 774 P.2d at 507. She had brief conversations 
with the male drivers of two other vehicles before she got into 
the pickup truck. The driver of the pickup attempted to evade 
the officers before he was finally stopped. 
In assessing whether these facts gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion of a prostitution deal, the Utah Court of Appeals cited 
with approval language from Wood v. United States, 498 A.2d 1140 
(D.C. 1985). Referring to similar facts, the court in Wood wrote 
that "although there could conceivably have been an innocent 
explanation of appellant's conduct, the law does not require that 
all innocent explanations for a person's actions be absent before 
those actions can provide probable cause for arrest." Id. at 
1144, quoting, Tobias v. United States, 375 A.2d 491, 494 (D.C. 
1977). According to the Utah Court of Appeals, this rule also 
applies to cases involving reasonable suspicion. 
The Holmes decision illustrates again how the Defendant's 
argument shifts th€> focus of the court from the relevant inquiry. 
Defendant claims that because his conduct was consistent with 
innocent behavior, it could not give rise to reasonable 
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suspicion. Such a rule would require this court to consider 
every innocent explanation for the Defendant's conduct, 
regardless of plausibility. The court's time would be occupied 
in the consideration of remote hypothetical facts, rather than 
the undisputed facts before it. 
In summary, in assessing the existence of reasonable 
suspicion, this court need not trouble itself with whether the 
Defendant's conduct is "innocent" or "guilty." Innocent behavior 
will "frequently provide the basis for a showing" of reasonable 
suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). Nor 
must this court occupy its time in dismissing every innocent 
explanation of the Defendant's conduct. 
Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the "totality of the 
circumstances" would lead a reasonable officer to conclude, in 
light of his or her experience, that a crime was being committed. 
If this court is to analyze the "totality of the circumstances," 
then it must be free to assess the "degree of suspicion" that 
attaches to all the facts taken together, including those that 
are consistent with innocent behavior. Id. 
Officer Weinmuller testified at trial that 1) the Defendant 
possessed a small (one half inch), rolled cigarette; 2) the 
Defendant "took some hits" off the cigarette; and 3) that as the 
Defendant inhaled on it, the tip of the cigarette "rapidly 
disintegrated." (T.T. 6). The record further shows that the 
Defendant performed these acts in the deserted parking lot of an 
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establishment that was not open for business. (T.T. 18).2 Even 
if no one of these factors, standing alone, is proof of illegal 
conduct, and even though each, standing alone, meiy be consistent 
with innocent conduct, the "totality of the circumstances" or the 
combination of these factors amount to reasonable suspicion. 
II. THE CITY ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME OF 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, THEREFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE DEFENDANT'S INCULPATORY 
STATEMENTS. 
A. The Standard Of Review 
Whether the corpus delicti rule bars admission of the 
inculpatory statemcmts of the Defendant is a "question of law" 
and accordingly, this court should review the trial court's 
decision for correctness. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 
(Utah 1991). However, even where evidence is improperly 
admitted, reversal is not required unless the "substantial 
rights" of the Defendant were affected. Utah R. of Evid. 103 
(1992). Harmless error cannot be the cause of reversal on 
appeal. 
B. The City Offered Clear And Convincing Evidence That A 
Wrong Was Done And That The Wrong Was Effected By A 
Criminal Agency. 
The corpus delicti rule provides that "before a defendant's 
inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence against the 
defendant," the City must "prove the occurrence of a crime" or 
2
 The Utah Court of Appeals has held that whether a business 
is open or closed is relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry 
because if the business is closed, fewer legitimate reasons for 
being near the business exist. State v. Baumcraertel, 762 P. 2d 2, 
4 (Utah App. 1988) . 
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the "corpus delicti." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 
1991). The rule exists as a "safeguard against convicting the 
innocent on the strength of false confessions. Id., quoting, 
State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 373, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (Utah 
1957) . 
To establish the corpus delicti of any crime, the 
prosecution must show 1) that a "wrong, an injury, or a damage 
has been done"; and 2) that the wrong was "effected by a criminal 
agency" or in other words, by "unlawful means." State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991). The City must 
establish these two factors by "clear and convincing evidence." 
Id. 821 P.2d at 1163. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "clear and convincing 
evidence . . . implies something more than the . . . requirement 
of a preponderance, or greater weight, of the evidence, and 
something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Child v. 
Child, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1958). Beyond this guideline, 
what constitutes clear and convincing evidence is "primarily for 
the trial court to determine." Gold Oil Land Dev. Corp. v. 
Davis, 611 P.2d 711, 713, n. 4 (Utah 1980). 
To determine the corpus delicti for the crime of possession 
of a controlled substance, this court must first look to the 
relevant statute. Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) of the Utah Code 
states that it is unlawful "for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance." Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (1990). Section 58-37-2(27) states 
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that "possess" as used in Chapter 37 means "the joint or 
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holdincf, retaining, 
belonging, maintaining, obtaining or the application or 
inhalation" of a controlled substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(27) (1990). 
Under Utah law, "inahalation" of a controlled substance 
constitutes possession. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(27) (1990). 
Thus, to establish the corpus delicti for possession of 
marijuana, the City must show that 1) marijuana was inahaled (a 
wrong was committed): and 2) the inhalation was accomplished 
knowingly and intentionally by someone (the wrong was effected by 
unlawful means). 
From a distance of ten feet, Officer Weinmuller watched the 
Defendant inhale off a small, rolled cigarette that burned 
rapidly. From a distance of three feet, she observed that the 
Defendant was "exhaling smoke" as he opened the door of his 
truck. Immediately, Weinmuller detected a strong odor of 
marijuana on the Defendant's breath and about his person. (T.T. 
8). Officer Weinmuller has never mistaken the smell of burning 
tobacco for the smell of burning marijuana. (T.T. 15). 
In addition, as noted above, the Defendant's cigarette 
exhibited the physical characteristics of a marijuana joint. It 
was small, rolled, and burned faster than a commercial cigarette. 
(T.T.6). Finally, Officer Weinmuller testified that the effect 
of the substance on the Defendant's physical condition was 
consistent with the effect of marijuana. A Nystagmus test 
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revealed that the Defendants eyes were very bloodshot and that 
they were "jerking rapidly at maximum deviation and at 4 5 
degrees." (T.T. 9). Also, the Defendant's speech was slowed. 
All these factors—the Defendant's exhaling smoke, the 
immediate smell of marijuana about his person, the physical 
attributes of the cigarette, and the condition of the Defendant— 
combine to show clearly and convincingly that the Defendant had 
inhaled off a marijuana joint and therefore "possessed marijuana" 
in violation of the Utah Code. 
The Defendant contends that the City must show that the 
Defendant smoked an "identifiable amount" of marijuana. (T.T. 
18). The corpus delicti rule, however, does not require that the 
City put on "real evidence." Rather, the City must show "clearly 
and convincingly" that marijuana was possessed. Whether the City 
meets this burden by putting on real or circumstantial evidence 
is irrelevant. 
Having shown that a wrong was committed, the City must 
complete its burden by showing that the wrong was committed by 
unlawful means. The same factors supporting part one of the 
corpus delicti test—that a wrong was committed—may support this 
second part. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Utah App. 
1991) . This is the case here. Possession of marijuana, as 
established in part one of the test, is of itself unlawful. The 
Defendant must of course perform the wrong knowingly and 
intentionally; however, there is nothing in the record to show 
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that the Defendant inhaled from the cigarette unintentionally or 
without knowledge that he was in fact smoking.3 
By showing clearly and convincingly that the Defendant 
possessed marijuana unlawfully, the City established the corpus 
delicti for the crime of possession of a controlled substance as 
set forth in section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) of the Utah Code. The City 
did so with evidence that was independent of the Defendant's 
inculpatory statements. Therefore, even if the trial court 
admitted the Defendant's incriminating statements prematurely— 
before the City established the corpus delicti—that error was 
harmless because the "evidence was clearly sufficient to 
establish corpus delicti without the post-offense statements.ff 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Utah 1991). 
III. THE CITY PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE SUBSTANCE 
POSSESSED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS MARIJUANA. 
A. Standard of Review 
At the close of the City's case, Defendant moved for a 
directed verdict. (T.T. 19-22). The trial court denied the 
motion. (T.T. 22). Such a motion is correctly denied where the 
prosecution has "established a prima facia case against the 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements 
3
 Technically, the City must show only that the wrong was 
committed by a criminal agency. The City is under no requirement 
to show that "the accused was the guilty agent." State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah App. 1991), citing, State v. Calamity, 
735 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1987); State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 
(Utah 1977); State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 376-77, 314 P.2d 353, 
356 (Utah 1957); State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 372, 275 P.2d 173, 
(Utah 1954); State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 580, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 
(Utah 1943) . 
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of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett, 184 U.A.R. 34 (Utah 
1992), quoting, State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). 
On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the ultimate verdict. In reviewing this 
challenge, the "evidence and the reasonable inferences which may 
be drawn therefrom" must be assessed in the light "most 
favorable" to the verdict. State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 
1330 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah 1989) . This court cannot set aside the trial court's 
decision unless 1) it was "clearly erroneous" and "against the 
clear weight of evidence"; or 2) the court reaches "a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
B. The City Put On Direct Evidence Which Proved Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt That The Substance Possessed By Spotts 
Was Marijuana. 
To establish a prima facia case for possession of marijuana, 
the City must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
1) "knowingly and intentionally,11 2) "possessed a controlled 
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1989). As noted 
above, a person "possesses" marijuana by simply inhaling it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(27) (1989). 
The Defendant claims that because the City did not produce 
an identifiable amount of marijuana, it established its case by 
circumstantial evidence. If this were so, the standard set forth 
in United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), for 
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establishing the identity of a controlled substance by 
circumstantial evidence might have been applicable. However, the 
Defendant's claim mistakenly equates real evidence with direct 
evidence. 
Black's Law Dictionary gives the following definition of 
direct evidence: 
Evidence in the form of testimony from a witness who 
actually saw, heard or touched the subject of 
interrogation. [Citation omitted]. Evidence which if 
believed proves existence of fact in issue without 
inference or presumption. [Citation omitted]. 
Clearly this definition includes more than "real evidence" which 
constitutes the thing itself—in this case the marijuana. 
Because Officer Weinmuller is an eye-witness to the events 
in question, her testimony constitutes direct evidence. However, 
it is instructive to analyze which portions of her testimony 
establish a fact in issue without any inference or presumption. 
First, Officer Weinmuller testified that 1) the Defendant inhaled 
on a small, rolled cigarette that burned rapidly; 2) the 
defendant was exhaling smoke when he got out of his vehicle; 3) 
the odor of marijuana emanated from the Defendant's person and 
was immediately detectable and strong. (T.T. 6, 8-9). She also 
testified that she has never mistaken the smell of burning 
marijuana for burning tobacco. (T.T. 15). If this testimony is 
believed, it proves without inference that the substance in 
Defendant's possession was marijuana. 
Officer Weinmuller also testified that the Defendant made 
several inculpatory statements. When Officer Weinmuller asked 
22 
the Defendant what he had done with the marijuana cigarette, he 
replied that he had given it to his friend. (T.T. 10). The 
Defendant also admitted inhaling from (taking a few "hits" off) 
the marijuana cigarette. (T.T. 11). Finally, when Officer 
Weinmuller told the Defendant that it was illegal to possess 
marijuana and to drive while impaired by marijuana, he replied, 
"Do you think I would be driving if it was going to affect my 
driving?" (T.T. II).4 Again, these statements, if believed, 
establish without inference that the substance possessed by the 
Defendant was marijuana. 
By marshalling this direct evidence, the City proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
inhaled from a marijuana cigarette. Thus, the Dolan factors for 
proof by circumstantial evidence are not applicable. Further, 
because the City put on believable evidence of the elements of 
the prima facia case, the trial court did not err in denying the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss. Likewise, in light of this 
4
 Defendant argues that the trial court mistakenly referred 
to these statements as "admissions" and that he made no 
"incriminating references such that it can be inferred that . . . 
[he] acquiesced in statements against his interest." (Defendant's 
Brief. 20, 3 0) . This argument is clearly without merit. In 
questioning the Defendant, Officer Weinmuller characterized the 
joint as a "marijuana cigarette." (T.T. 10). The Defendant 
thereafter admitted to taking a few hits off it, and said "I gave 
it to my friend." (T.T. 11). The antecedent of the pronoun "it" 
is clearly "marijuana cigarette." Similarly, when Officer 
Weinmuller told the Defendant that it was illegal to drive while 
impaired by marijuana, the Defendant replied "Do you think I would 
be driving if it was going to effect my driving?" (T.T. 11) . 
Again the antecedent to the pronoun "it" is clearly marijuana. 
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evidence, the trial court's decision was neither "clearly 
erroneous" nor "against the great weight of evidence." 
C. In The Alternative, The City Proffered Sufficient 
Circumstantial Evidence To Establish Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt That The Substance Smoked By The 
Defendant Was Marijuana. 
Even if the City's evidence is categorized as circumstantial 
rather than direct, that circumstantial evidence established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance possessed by the 
Defendant was marijuana. Utah courts have not defined a standard 
for proving the identity of a controlled substance by 
circumstantial evidence. We must therefore look to the well-
developed principles established by the federal courts. 
Circumstantial evidence may establish the identity of a 
controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 
Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Bacrgett, 890 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Eakes, 783 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir. 1986); United States 
v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976). Where, as in the 
case at bar, the police have failed to "seize and analyze the 
chemical composition of the alleged narcotic substance, there 
must be enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference 
that the defendant actually did possess the drugs in question." 
Raggett, 890 F.2d at 1096. 
In United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in establishing the 
identity of a controlled substance, relevant circumstantial proof 
may include 1) "evidence of the physical appearance of the 
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substance involved in the transaction"; 2) proof that the 
substance "produced the expected effects when sampled by someone 
familiar with the illicit drug"; 3) evidence that "the substance 
was used in the same manner as the illicit drug"; 4) "testimony 
that a high price was paid in cash for the substance"; 5) 
"evidence that the transactions involving the substance were 
carried on with secrecy or deviousness"; and 6) evidence that the 
Defendant "called the substance by name" or others did so in the 
defendant's presence. 
These factors were never intended to be an exhaustive list. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at the list by 
examining what factors had been deemed relevant in the past. The 
Court cited several cases, only one of which relied on all six 
factors in determining the identity of the substance in question. 
United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir. 1974), 
cert, den'd., 419 U.S. 1024 (1974); United States v. Quesada, 512 
F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1975), cert, den'd., 423 U.S. 946 
(1975); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 438-39 (7th Cir. 
1974), cert den'd., 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v. 
Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 314 (8th Cir. 1973), cert, den'd., 412 U.S. 
931 (1973); United States v. Fantuzzi, 463 F.2d 683, 689, note 7 
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 828-29 
(2nd Cir. 1962), cert, den'd., 372 U.S. 959 (1963); Toliver v. 
United States, 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955). 
The Dolan opinion itself indicates that the list was not 
conjunctive. The defendant in Dolan had been convicted of four 
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counts of possession. The State had produced evidence of all six 
factors for only one of the counts. Nevertheless, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that on all four counts, the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine* that the 
substance in question was a narcotic. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1222-23. 
Both pre-Dolan and post-Dolan courts have found additional 
factors relevant where the identity of a controlled substance 
must be proved circumstantially. The fact that the substance has 
been successfully resold to uncomplaining customers was deemed 
probative in many pre-Dolan cases. United States v. Eakesy 783 
F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ouesada, 512 F.2d 
1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1975), cert, den'd., 423 U.S. 946 (1975); 
United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir. 1974), 
cert, den'd., 419 U.S. 1024 (1974); United States v. Agueci, 310 
F.2d 817, 828-29 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert, den'd., 372 U.S. 959 
(1963) . 
The fact that all parties acted "consistent with the idea11 
that the substance in question was a controlled substance may 
also be considered, as can the fact that addiction resulted from 
use of the substance. United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 314 
(8th Cir. 1973), cert, den'd., 412 U.S. 931 (1973). The 
defendant's prior use of drugs and involvement in drug 
transactions might be relevant as well. Toliver v. United 
States, 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955). The packaging of the 
drug has also been considered circumstantially probative. United 
States v. Eakes, 783 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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In summary, the list of circumstantial proof listed in Dolan 
was not meant to be an exhaustive list. Convictions for 
possession might stand on less than all six factors or on 
different factors entirely. The only concrete requirement is 
that the circumstantial evidence offered prove the identity of 
the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether this burden is 
met is a decision for the court, and as noted above, cannot be 
reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous and against the clear 
weight of evidence. 
In the case at bar, the City offered circumstantial evidence 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
possessed marijuana. When Officer Weinmuller asked the Defendant 
what he had done with the marijuana cigarette, he replied that he 
had given it to his friend. (T.T. 10). The Defendant also 
admitted inhaling from (taking a few "hits" off) the marijuana 
cigarette. (T.T. 11). When Officer Weinmuller told the 
Defendant that it was illegal to possess marijuana and to drive 
while impaired by marijuana, he replied, "Do you think I would be 
driving if it was going to affect my driving?11 (T.T. 11) . 
These admissions by the Defendant were corroborated by other 
circumstantial proof. The substance smoked by the Defendant had 
produced the expected effects of marijuana. The Defendant's 
speech was slowed and the results of his Nystagmus test were 
consistent with those of a person impaired by a controlled 
substance. (T.T. 8-9). 
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Likewise, the Defendant used the substance in the same 
manner marijuana is used. Officer Weinmuller testified that the 
cigarette smoked by the Defendant was hand-rolled, shorter than a 
commercial cigarette, and burned more rapidly. (T.T. 6). 
Officer Weinmuller had been trained to recognize these physical 
characteristics as consistent with those of a marijuana joint. 
(T.T. 6). Also, the Defendant smoked the substance in a vacant 
parking lot. (T.T. 18). While this may not rise to the level of 
deviousness, it does suggest that the Defendant desired to remove 
himself from the public eye before using the substance. 
Finally, when the Defendant got out of his vehicle, he was 
exhaling smoke. Officer Weinmuller, who was then 3 feet from the 
Defendant, testified that she immediately detected the strong 
odor of marijuana on the Defendant's breath and around his 
person. (T.T. 7-8, 16). She further testified that she has 
never mistaken the smell of burning tobacco for the smell of 
burning marijuana. (T.T. 15). 
The trial court correctly held that the totality of this 
circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt the 
Defendant had been in possession of marijuana in violation of 
Utah law. This holding was neither "clearly erroneous11 nor 
against the clear weight of evidence, and therefore it must be 
affirmed on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee requests this court to 
affirm the decision of the lower court. 
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